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 The Metaphysics of the 
Sublime: Old Wine, New 
Wineskin? 
Philip Rossi, S.J. 






John Milbank’s and Phillip Blond’s narratives of modernity’s descent to 
nihilism identify the “metaphysics of the sublime” as a feature of modernity, 
assimilated from Kant’s critical project, that is particularly problematic for the 
robust post-modern Christian theology proposed in Radical Orthodoxy. This 
essay argues that the sublime is not the concept most fundamental to their 
account of Kant’s role in modernity. Far more important is the 
“phenomenon/noumenon” distinction, which Milbank and Blond read as a 
“two-world” distinction—an understanding that, despite a long history in Kant 
interpretation, is not Kant’s. It is less important, however, that constructive 
dialogue between Radical Orthodoxy and Catholic theology correct this 
misreading of Kant. More important will be efforts to understand the 
metaphor of the “immense depth of things,” which Radical Orthodox offers in 
contrast to the “metaphysics of the sublime,” particularly in relation to the 
concepts of participation and the analogy of attribution that emerge from 
Radical Orthodoxy’s reading of Aquinas.  
 
Students and teachers alike will readily confirm that Kant is not 
an “easy read.” Even the eminent American Kant scholar, Lewis White 
Beck, memorably remarked, “It is regrettable that Kant was not more 
careful; though had he been so, the race of Kant commentators would 
be unemployed” (Beck 1960, 221). Yet treatments of Kant by 
proponents of Radical Orthodoxy, such as John Milbank and Phillip 
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Blond, prove often enough to be an even harder “read” than Kant’s 
own texts. In my own case, this difficultly may arise from the fact that 
years of wrestling with Kant’s texts from a philosophical stance has 
made it difficult for me to stretch my interpretive muscles into this 
newly articulated theological grip for gaining purchase on the 
significance of his work for these “post-modern” times. Yet the 
difficulty in reading Milbank et al. on Kant may also stem from a 
hazard endemic to any effort to show the bearing that the work of a 
thinker from a previous generation has upon the thought and practice 
of our own. Conceptual vertigo is one likely outcome from trying to 
read Kant, as Radical Orthodoxy seeks to do, from a multiple “optic”: 
as a sign of (and to) both his time and ours—let alone as also a sign to 
and for times between his and ours. Finally, another part of the 
difficulty may stem from the fact that Milbank and Blond both attend 
to Kantian texts—most notably the Critique of the Power of 
Judgment—that are unfamiliar inasmuch as they have, for far too long 
a time, undeservedly held little interest as a field of gainful 
employment among the race of Kant scholars.  
 
This essay does not propose to address all of the difficulties 
involved in reading “Radical Orthodoxy on Kant”; neither does it plan 
to provide an extended gloss on some of the unjustly neglected 
Kantian texts that are central to such a reading of Kant. Its main task 
to is to begin to decipher the role that Milbank and Blond ascribe to 
Kant in the “alternative story” they tell about the intellectual trajectory 
of modernity. In their telling, Kant is “the fulfillment, not the 
overcoming, of late scholasticism” (Milbank 2000, 38). Being such 
fulfillment, however, garners little praise. Milbank remarks that “Kant 
perfects metaphysical dogmatism because his limiting of the import of 
the phenomenal is attained only by a safeguarding of the noumenal 
against the phenomenal, which after all is the real pietistic, anti-
Catholic and anti ‘mystical’ aim of the critical philosophy” (Milbank 
2000, 39).  
 
Placing Kant among the adversarii of Christian orthodoxy is 
hardly new. He usually gets placed there in virtue of his 
dismantlement of the putatively “traditional” arguments for the 
existence of God and for the immortality of the soul, or for his seeming 
reduction of religion to following the moral dictates of conscience, 
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and/or for an allegedly Pelagian account of moral conversion which is 
coupled to a theory of atonement that, at best, assigns only a 
symbolically representative function to the death and resurrection of 
Jesus.1 As the story of modernity unfolds in the hands of Milbank and 
Blond, however, the feature they intriguingly highlight for Kant’s role 
in its denouement is none of the above; it is, instead, his articulation 
of the notion of the sublime.2 As described by Milbank, the sublime 
constitutes “a realm of ineffable majesty beyond the bounds of the 
possibility of theoretical knowledge, a domain which cannot be 
imaginatively represented, and yet whose overwhelming presence can 
be acknowledged by our frustrated imaginative powers” (Milbank 
1990, 204).  
 
The sublime carries a great deal of weight in this telling of the 
story of modernity. When Milbank looks back to locate Kant in relation 
to his predecessors, he sees the sublime functioning to mark the 
(vast) distance that separates Kant’s treatment of transcendence from 
those accounts that can be considered characteristic of Patristic and 
“early to high” Scholastic thought about “consummate transcendence” 
(Milbank 2000, 38):  
 
If one fails to realize this [i.e., the Kantian denial of any real kinship between 
the visible and the invisible worlds], then the danger is that one will confuse 
the Kantian sublimity of pure infinite possibility with the traditional theological 
notion of a divine darkness that is not the abyss of contentless will, but rather 
the darkness to us of an utterly dazzling light suffusing its manifold infinite of 
formed content with the full intensity of a single illumination. (Milbank 2000, 
40)  
 
In looking forward to the full articulation of the modern that succeeds 
upon Kant, the sublime then becomes the token of a world and culture 
from which God is, in principle, absent:  
 
And it is in this form [as immanent to rationality(?)] that one could suggest 
that the Kantian theory of the sublime completes the secular dismissal of God 
from the realm of experience. Conceived in this way, the sublime then 
provides a uniquely successful synthesis of both the nominalist fear of God and 
the Scotist emphasis on a prior and determinate sphere of knowledge (an 
emphasis that actually ends with the dismissal of God from cognition). The 
peculiar though understandable result of this is that God becomes both 
unknowable and yet deeply feared. (Blond 1998, 15)  
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In accord with the story’s close interweaving of the theological with the 
theoretical underpinnings of cultural and political practice, the sublime, 
as token of the a-theistic and the nihilistic, has an important function 
in the area of public discourse. It serves as the fundamental 
conceptual legitimation for the marginalization of theology and religion 
in modernity—in Milbank’s terms, for “the policing of the sublime”—by 
social science and the secular polity:  
 
Sociology’s “policing of the sublime” exactly coincides with the actual 
operations of secular society which excludes religion from its modes of 
“discipline and control,” while protecting it as a ‘private’ value, and sometimes 
invoking it at the public level to overcome the antinomy of a purely 
instrumental and goalless rationality, which is yet made to bear the burden of 
ultimate political purpose. (Milbank 1990, 106)  
 
Finally, the sublime has a role to play not only in fencing the 
theological off from public practice but also in shaping the practices of 
the liberal polity that is arguably the paradigmatic public form of 
modernity:  
 
In the metaphysics of the sublime the absolutely equal and formally fixed 
relationship in which we, as liberal subjects, stand to the unknown absolute, 
serves to confirm the world (the enlightened bourgeois world) as it is. (Milbank 
1997, 12)  
 
Milbank and Blond are not the first to hear in The Critique of the 
Power of Judgment resonances with profound power to affect the 
tonality of the whole of Kant’s critical theory; nor are they even the 
first to identify the theological, social, and political chords that he 
sounds within the complexity of this text.3 As I noted earlier, what 
initially strikes one as new in their account is the selection of the 
Kantian sublime as the concept that most fully presents the central 
features  of Kant’s critical project that are most problematic with 
respect to the kind of robust Christian theology for a post-modern era 
that Radical Orthodoxy seeks to articulate. Yet, as I have tried to 
puzzle out the particulars of their reading of the Kantian sublime I 
have found myself wondering whether there is anything remarkably 
new here, be it with respect to their analysis of the notion of the 
sublime or in the lineaments of the story/argument that makes Kant 
“the fulfillment, not the overcoming, of late scholasticism.”  
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In order to bring into better focus the question of whether this is 
a new criticism of Kant, let me return to a claim of Milbank’s that I 
cited earlier: “Kant perfects metaphysical dogmatism because his 
limiting of the import of the phenomenal is attained only by a 
safeguarding of the noumenal against the phenomenal, which after all 
is the real pietistic, anti-Catholic and anti ‘mystical’ aim of the critical 
philosophy” (added emphasis mine). I will have to leave to another 
time the exploration of what Milbank may have in mind by his three-
fold characterization of the “real” aim of the critical philosophy as 
“pietistic, anti-Catholic, and anti ‘mystical.’” I consider the key point to 
examine, instead, to lie in the expression “a safeguarding of the 
noumenal against the phenomenal”—a phrase which itself resonates 
with other “dualizing,” if not dualistic, characterizations Milbank and 
Blond each make of Kant’s critical philosophy. Continuing in the same 
vein, Milbank notes “What is refused here is not the groundless 
extrapolation from the phenomenal, but rather (without grounds) any 
notion of attributive analogy or participation, that is to say any real 
kinship between the visible and invisible worlds (as has been well 
argued by Phillip Blond)” (Milbank 2000, 39).4 In another context, he 
writes:  
 
What the radical pietists realised was that to be human means, primarily, that 
we must reckon with the immense depth behind things. There are only two 
possible attitudes towards this depth: for the first, like Kant, we distinguish 
what is clear from what is hidden; but then the depth is an abyss, and what 
appears, as only apparent, will equally induce vertigo. This is why criticism, 
the attitude of pure reason itself, is also the stance of nihilism. . . . The second 
possibility is that we trust the depth, and appearance as the gift of depth, and 
history as the restoration of the loss of this depth in Christ. (Milbank 1999, 32, 
emphasis mine)  
 
Remarks such as these, especially when read in coordination 
with Blond’s charges against Kant’s “cognitively self-sufficient finitude” 
(Blond 1998, 15), his observations about “Kant’s sundering of thought 
from reality” (Blond 1998, 16) and the “Kantian opposition between 
the conceptual and empirical” (Blond 1998, 38)5 indicate to me that 
the sublime may not be the concept most fundamental to the tale they 
have told and to Kant’s role in that tale. What seems to bear far more 
weight is the construal given to Kant’s much vexed distinction between 
the “phenomenal” and the “noumenal.” It should hardly be surprising 
that the distinction that Kant himself considered to be fundamental to 
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his whole critical enterprise and that proved to be a point of fierce 
contention in the reception of the critical philosophy should again be 
contested in Milbank’s and Blond’s effort to read Kant as a (cautionary) 
sign for our times. Nor should it be surprising that their construal 
takes this distinction to mark a divide between two “worlds”—a divide 
for which the critical project is then taken to provide a bridge—for this 
is a construal that has a venerable history in Kant interpretation. It is, 
moreover, a construal that has had a significant impact on subsequent 
Western thought and culture—including many of the deleterious ones 
that Milbank and Blond justifiably bemoan.  
 
There is a fundamental problem with such a “two-worlds” 
construal of this distinction, however: There are good reasons to think 
that it is not Kant’s own construal. However else Kant understood the 
phenomenon-noumenon distinction—and, considering the amount of 
conceptual work he asks it to do in his critical philosophy, he 
understood it in many ways, not all of them fully coherent with one 
another—he did not understand it as fundamentally marking a 
distinction between two “worlds.” The same, I believe, can be said for 
other related distinctions he uses to characterize the properly human 
engagement with the cosmos, such as that between sensibility and 
understanding, or between the theoretical and the practical uses of 
reason. These are not—and cannot be—a “two world” distinctions 
because Kant takes the most fundamental “deliverance” of our human 
engagement with the “world” to be inescapably unitary—as we 
ourselves are, even though we also find ourselves engaging that world 
in ways that present themselves to our reflective considerations as 
deeply different. There is no bridge that we need to build between two 
“worlds” because there is a single “world.” That we need to deal with 
it, however, in different ways—i.e., in Kant’s terms, theoretically and 
practically in the use of our reason—indicates something that bears 
principally upon our make up as human, rather than upon the world 
that we humans engage. Whatever duality there may be, it is one that 
we encounter within the unity of our humanness as embodied finite 
reason.  
This brief essay is not the appropriate place to spell out the 
various considerations from Kant’s texts and from his historical context 
that indicate why this long interpretive tradition is mistaken. I am 
more concerned with trying to figure out how and why construing Kant 
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as a “two-world” theorist serves the purposes of the story that Milbank 
and Blond tell. A quite tempting immediate answer might be that 
construing Kant this ways allows him to be cast in quite unambiguous 
terms as a “bad guy”—a bright bad guy, and even, if one is especially 
charitable, an unwitting bad guy, but a bad guy nonetheless. That, 
however, seems to me to be far too easy an answer, in part because it 
is likely to lead us to argue (interminably) about whether or not Kant 
really is a bad guy. That argument, however, is one that I believe 
would distract us from engaging in a constructive manner the more 
fundamental theological concerns of “Radical Orthodoxy,” since those 
concerns do not seem to turn crucially upon either the historical or the 
philosophical accuracy of this movement’s reading of Kant.  
 
I think a more helpful way to go about understanding the role in 
which Milbank and Blond have cast Kant is to return to what they want 
to affirm over against a “two-worlds” Kant. Let me return to a couple 
of passages cited earlier in this essay:  
 
What is refused here is not the groundless extrapolation from the phenomenal, 
but rather (without grounds) any notion of attributive analogy or participation, 
that is to say any real kinship between the visible and invisible worlds (as has 
been well argued by Phillip Blond). (Milbank 2000, 39, emphasis mine)  
 
What the radical pietists realised was that to be human means, primarily, that 
we must reckon with the immense depth behind things. There are only two 
possible attitudes towards this depth: for the first, like Kant, we distinguish 
what is clear from what is hidden; but then the depth is an abyss, and what 
appears, as only apparent, will equally induce vertigo. This is why criticism, 
the attitude of pure reason itself, is also the stance of nihilism. . . . The second 
possibility is that we trust the depth, and appearance as the gift of depth, and 
history as the restoration of the loss of this depth in Christ. (Milbank 1999, 32, 
emphasis mine)  
 
These passages contain three important phrases that, in view of their 
evident rhetorical function as counters to a putatively “Kantian” 
philosophical syntax of “the sublime,” stand in need of further 
“parsing” that would identify their function principally in terms of the 
theological/philosophical syntax that Radical Orthodoxy is endeavoring 
to articulate. Such parsing, I suspect, could provide an appropriate 
place from which a conversation—one less polemical than so far seems 
to be the case—might begin between Radical Orthodoxy and the forms 
of Catholic theology of which Radical Orthodoxy has been so sharply 
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critical. Since it is not clear to me to what extent the main proponents 
of Radical Orthodoxy are ready to shift the conversation to a less 
polemical mode, it is at some peril that I, or anyone not a proponent, 
single out what appear “from outside” as crucial markers of its positive 
program. I thus do not propose to do any extensive parsing of these 
phrases here. I shall, instead, only indicate why I think these are 
phrases whose parsing might clear a small patch of common ground 
on which to parley rather than polemicize—and hope that some might 
come to parley. 
 
The first is the imperative that “we must reckon with the 
immense depth behind things.” This imperative seems very closely 
aligned to what John Paul II has characterized as the “sapiential 
dimension [of philosophy] as a search for the ultimate and overarching 
meaning of life” (John Paul II 1998, §81)—a search that he sees as 
basic to the dynamics of human life. I think that a fruitful parsing of 
Milbank’s “depth” metaphor—which I also take to be more than “mere” 
metaphor—might begin by locating it with reference to the dynamics 
of the quest for meaning articulated by John Paul II. Such a linkage 
would allow a far more differentiated analysis of the “secular” and of 
the thinkers and the practices that have been charged with bringing 
about and sustaining the secular. Like the proponents of Radical 
Orthodoxy, John Paul II’s diagnosis of modernity traces its trajectory 
towards nihilism, but also frames it in a larger trajectory of grace that, 
more generously than the one traced in Radical Orthodoxy’s narrative, 
enables the dynamics of that quest to function even within nihilism’s 
most vehement denials of meaning. A similar generosity of grace can 
be found in Charles Taylor’s reading of modernity in Sources of the 
Self, a work in which exhibits to readers prepared to look for it a deep 
seated Catholic theological sensibility that is more sure-handed and 
less self-consciously proclaimed than that often found in the writings 
of Radical Orthodoxy.  
 
The second is “the refusal of any notion of attributive analogy or 
participation, that is to say any real kinship between the visible and 
the invisible worlds.” My suspicion here is that this concatenation of 
phrases captures a key epistemic and metaphysical worry that drives 
radical orthodoxy in that they are all evocative of a fundamental 
“connection” to God—or, more precisely, a fundamental manner of 
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intelligibly articulating such a connection—that is lost, severed, or 
denied by and in the secular. This severance constitutes one defining 
feature of “the stance of nihilism” into which all “secular” thinking is 
consigned. In theological terms, the focus of this worry is upon the 
possibility of rendering robustly intelligible the full scope of the 
doctrine of Creation to and for a techno-empirical culture that has 
made a conceptually and symbolically impoverished understanding of 
causality the most potent instrument of its dominance. A similar worry 
seems operative in the work of George Steiner, and in response to 
such a worry, David Burrell, Kathryn Tanner, and Robert Sokolowski 
have all offered evocative proposals for construing this doctrine in 
“non-contrastive” terms that properly limn “its unique philosophic-
linguistic situation” (Burrell 1993, 8) that then allow us to “finesse the 
‘zero-sum’ presumptions [that modern culture has] of any divine-
human encounter” (Burrell 1993, 2). Exploration along the axes of 
these proposals may clear an area with the potential to serve as 
common ground.  
 
The third phrase is “that we trust the depth, and appearance as 
the gift of depth, and history as the restoration of the loss of this 
depth in Christ”—which I take to capture an important Christological 
and soteriological thrust within the positive theological/philosophical 
program of Radical Orthodoxy. Parsing here might usefully attend once 
again to the metaphor of “depth,” but, in this case, a more 
fundamental focus would be upon the form and function of the “trust” 
that stands over against, first, the “refusal” that is portrayed as the 
characteristic attitude of the secular’s encounter with “appearance” 
and the “visible world” and, second, the “vertigo” that is taken as the 
characteristic outcome of that encounter. Charles Taylor’s work, 
particularly the final three chapters of Sources of the Self, may prove 
instructive here, even though it may not be directly helpful for clearing 
common ground inasmuch as its analysis is indexed to a different 
reading of Kant. Taylor reads modernity’s engagement with the 
“depth” of appearances from an optic in which the “beautiful,” the 
other lens of Kant’s “Analytic of the Power of Aesthetic Judgment,” 
figures far more prominently than does the “sublime.” His reading 
discerns in this engagement a set of attitudes and outcomes that is far 
more richly variegated than seems to be displayed in the narrative of 
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modernity as it is told in the sample of the literature of Radical 




1 For a counter to the standard reading of Kant as Pelagian, see Mariña 
1997.  
2 Clayton Crockett (2001) also argues for the importance of the 
sublime as a marker of modernity, but claims that Milbank “recoils 
from the theological implications of this insight” which, on Crockett’s 
reading of Kant, affirms imagination as a radically decentering function 
of human subjectivity.  
3 A notable recent political reading of the third Critique is Arendt 1982. 
See also Beiner 1993.  
4 The mention of Phillip Blond is referenced to his “Introduction: 
Theology Before Philosophy” in Post Secular Philosophy (Blond 1998).  
5 Previously Blond had noted that “for Kant sensibility seems never to 
have any role other than to deliver over an acquiescence of the 
empirical domain to the human mind” (Blond 1998, 13; cf. footnote 25 
on p. 60).  
6 I wish to thank Matthew Powell for a careful reading of the 
penultimate version of this essay.  
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